untouched by the discharge.' He made similar statements in 1879 (I, 295, footnote), 1880 (I, 313), and 1888 (I, 386). On the other hand, in 1889 he made this important statement (I, 380, first footnote): 'In former papers I have spoken of what is known as the Intellectual Aura (I call it " dreamy state ") as being the positive element in some cases of the first degree of postepileptic states. . . . I now feel uncertain as to the exact symptomatological nature of the " dreamy state " ' (italics mine). From the last sentence one might infer the possibility that Jackson was no longer certain that the dreamy state is a release phenomenon, but this inference is weakened by the fact that Dr. James Taylor, in presenting Jackson's views on the dreamy state in the Introduction to Volume I of the Selected Writings (p. xii), mentioned nothing to indicate that Jackson had changed his original opinion.
In endeavouring to establish that the dreamy state may occur during the epileptic discharge, I shall employ two bits of evidence: (1) in some cases the dreamy state occurs as the initial manifestation of severe fits; (2) in some cases it repeatedly occurs by itself for a considerable length of time before the appearance of the first severe fit. The data supporting these statements will now be cited.
Cases in which a Dreamy State is the Initial Manifestation of Severe Fits.-In the case of the patient ' Quaerens,' Jackson said (I, 390) that the patient had a dreamy state 'at the onset of his fits.' The patient X, whose case was studied by Ferrier and reported by Jackson (I, 398), described her fits as consisting of three distinct stages, the first being a dreamy state occurs by itself for a considerable time before the appearance of the first severe fit, it cannot be regarded otherwise than as an aura. A comparison may in these respects be made with other auras, e.g. the common epigastric aura. Jackson said (I, 285) that patients 'will tell us that for months before they had any affection of consciousness preceded by an " epigastric sensation," they occasionally had that sensation alone, and thought little or nothing of it. . . . It is certain that these sensations may occur paroxysmally for months without anything further. The fact that such a paroxysmal sensation is often epileptic in nature is shown by the future of the cases: undoubted epileptic affections, attacks with convulsions and tongue-biting, come on, and each of these severe paroxysms is preceded by the sensation. What was once all is now the so-called warning of the severe fit. Strictly speaking, it was when it occurred alone a rudimentary or incipient fit of epilepsy; and when it becomes what we call a warning, since a severe fit follows, it is the inception of the severe fit.' The logic of the passage just quoted is impeccable. When a sensation repeatedly occurs alone for several months, after which it then begins to occur as the warning of severe fits, one is bound to conclude (1) that it occurs during discharge of the discharging lesion; (2) that this discharge is at first relatively slight, only after several months becoming severe enough to overcome the resistance of the lower centres, thereby causing a severe fit.
Jackson insisted that the dreamy state occurring alone should not too quickly be dismissed as hysterical. He said (I, 390) : 'He who neglects the " dreamy state " because it is indefinite . . . may not even surmise that his patient has the serious disease epilepsy in a rudimentary form until a severe fit comes to tell him so. Even then it may be said that the slight paroxysm " developed into " epilepsy; but I insist that such slight paroxysms are themselves epileptic.' I contend that in these cases not only is the dreamy state epileptic, but, since it for a time constituted ' all of the fit,' it must have occurred during the epileptic discharge.
Why, then, did Jackson regard the dreamy state as a release phenomenon rather than an aura ? The answer is best stated in the following passage (I, 313): 'They (dreamy states) cannot be owing to an epileptic discharge. It would be a remarkably well-directed and distributed epileptic discharge which would give rise to the exceedingly compound mental state of being somewhere else. Besides, it must not be forgotten that there very often is along with the dreamy state one of the crude subjective sensations mentioned (sensations of smell, etc.). It is scarcely likely that one thing, an epileptic discharge, should be the physical condition for a sudden stench in the nose-a crude sensation-and also the physical condition for an infinitely more elaborate psychical state.' In many other passages (e.g. I, 274 This reason is, I think, obvious; perhaps its very obviousness is why Jackson never stated it (assuming it is true that he never stated it). At any rate, we shall have to infer the reason. I think it is the fact that the dreamy state consists of a representation rather than a perception. While seeing a ball of fire or a spectral face, the patient perceives something (in this connexion it matters not that the perceived object is 'imaginary '), whereas during a dreamy state he has a representation of something. No one will dispute the statement that representation stands higher in the evolutionary scale than perception.
In order to understand this matter correctly, I suggest that there are two kinds of elaborateness, one relating to the criterion of complexity and the other to that of representativeness. Thus, as between seeing a ball of fire and seeing a spectral face, the latter is held to be the more elaborate because, as pointed out by Jackson in the quotation cited, the face exceeds the 
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ball of fire in complexity of outline and detail; both, however, are perceptions -in other words, as regards the criterion of representativeness, they are equally lacking in elaborateness. On the other hand, as between seeing a spectral face and having a dreamy state, the latter is held to be the more elaborate because it is a representative, while the former is only a perceptive, mental state. In this paper I am concerned with only the second kind of elaborateness.
Coming directly to the question of the occurrence of a representative mental state as an aura, one must consider the substrate correlative with the mental state in question. I refer to Jackson's important discussion of faint and vivid images. In a former paper 3 I considered Jackson's views on this matter at some length. Here I shall state his views only in the briefest way.
Jackson (II, 69, 70) said that when one has a vivid image (e.g. when one sees a brick), there is strong excitation of certain parts of lowest, middle and highest centres; when one has a faint image (e.g. when one merely thinks of a brick once seen), the excitation is weak and is confined to the highest centres. Now, since there are all degrees of intensity of an epileptic discharge, there is nothing incredible in the assumption that a faint image may occur as an epileptic aura. It is conceivable that in the substrate correlative with a given image a strong discharge will manifest itself as a vivid image, a weak discharge as a faint image. On this assumption, in the substrate correlative with the image of a ball of fire a strong discharge would cause one to ' see' a ball of fire, while a weak discharge would cause one to have a representation thereof-one would, in other words, have the sensation one has when one thinks of, or remembers, a ball of fire.
The epileptic discharge being excessive, it might seem that any mental state concomitant therewith must of necessity be vivid rather than faint. This, I believe, does not follow. When it is said that the epileptic discharge is excessive, the implication is only that it is relatively excessive; it need not be, though it may be, absolutely excessive. is discharged, not in response to stimulation issuing from neighbouring substrates, but because of abnormal instability of some part of it. Now, however faint be the discharge, it is excessive, since the substrate, if it were healthy, would, at the moment in question, be in a state of repose instead of discharge. In this case, then, the discharge is not normal but epileptic. Assuming it to be of just the right degree of severity, the patient will have a faint image ' brick,' this image constituting a true aura. If the attack happens to be the first the patient has had, and if it stops short with the aura, the patient will not know he has had an epileptic attack; all he will know is that for no apparent reason the idea of a brick suddenly popped into his mind. If later the occurrence is repeated over and over again, and if it is followed by loss of consciousness, etc., its epileptic nature will become evident.
I have seen one case in which the aura consisted of a faint image. An intelligent epileptic, studied at the Harrisburg State Hospital, said that at a previous stage of her disease she had had minor seizures, ushered in by a warning which she described thus: 'It was just as if I had seen a lot of garbage-the disgusting sensation that you'd get if you saw garbage. It was never as though I were actually smelling the garbage: it was just the sensation you'd have if you saw it without getting a whiff of it.' When one gets a whiff of garbage, one has a vivid olfactory image; when one sees garbage but gets no whiff of it, one has a vivid visual image but only a faint olfactory image. The patient's aura consisted of precisely this faint olfactory image.
The conclusions are offered that (1) dreamy states are representative, or, in Jackson's terms, faint, mental states; (2) representative mental states may occur during an epileptic discharge.
Attention may be called to an interesting point in the description of a dreamy state given by one of Jackson's patients, who said (I, 295) that while in this state ' I seem to think of a thousand different things all in a moment ' (Kinnier Wilson's 'panoramic memory' type). This feeling would seem to be related to an ordinary reminiscence in the same way that a generalized spasm is related to an ordinary muscular contraction. Jackson regarded the epileptic convulsion as a 'contention' (I, 431) of the patient's movements; it is ' nothing more than a sudden excessive and temporary contention of very many of the patient's familiar normal movements-those of smiling, mastication, articulating, singing, manipulating, etc.' In another place (I, 855) he gave the following illustration: 'If there be a centre for locomotion, then during slight sequent discharge of its elements in health there is walking or running; but if very many of those elements were to discharge, suddenly, rapidly, and excessively, the man walking or running would not go faster; on the contrary, he would be stopped, would be stiffened up into a tetanus-like attitude by the contemporaneous development of many locomotor movements ' (italics in original). Similarly, in the case of the man who 'seemed to think It is necessary to refer again to Jackson's statement (I, 313), cited above: 'It is scarcely likely that one thing, an epileptic discharge, should be the physical condition for a stench in the nose-a crude sensation-and also the physical condition for an infinitely more elaborate psychical state.' This, itseems to me, is by no means unlikely. There must be a tremendous amount of overlapping of the substrates correlative with the uncountable myriads of mental states which any person is capable of having, and it is not inconceivable that the substrate of a crude sensation may coincide in part with that of an elaborate state. In that case, discharge of those areas which the two substrates have in common, might, under proper conditions, manifest itself as simultaneously occurring crude and elaborate mental states. One may consider the analogy of a man who is father of a family, president of a bank and member of an amateur orchestra. In him the three roles of father, banker and musician overlap. A single event-his death-will cause three simultaneous manifestations: a family will be deprived of their father, a bank of its president, and musicians of a fellow-player.
The main part of this paper ends here. I conclude with a consideration of the origin of certain utterances made by Z during his dreamy states. Z wrote (I, 401): ' I think that during the abnormal state I generally verbalize some such phrase of simple recognition as, " Oh yes-I see," " Of course-I remember," etc.' I submit that these utterances bear to the sensation of the dreamy state a relation identical with that which chewing and tasting movements bear to crude sensations of taste and smell.
Jackson's explanation of the chewing and tasting movements that frequently accompany gustatory and olfactory auras is that they occur reflexly in response to excitation of gustatory centres. He said (I, 303): ' I think it will be found that in many . . . cases the voluminous mental state occurs in patients who have at the onset of their seizures some " digestive " sensation-smell, epigastric sensations, taste, or, in cases where there are movements implying excitation of centres for some such sensations, such movements as mastication ' (italics mine). Again (I, 385): ' Along with this voluminous mental state, there is frequently a " crude sensation " (" warning ") of (a) smell or (b) taste; (or, when there is no taste, there may be movements, chewing, tasting, spitting, implying (?) an epileptic discharge beginning in some part of the gustatory centres) . . .' (italics in original). Speaking of Z, Jackson said (I, 458) that the tasting movements which occurred in some of his dreamy states ' were, I suppose, the indirect " reflex " results of an epileptic discharge beginning in gustatory elements of a certain region of the cerebral cortex ' 
